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CHEMICAL TEST REFUSALS IN NEW YORK:
THE "TWO-HOUR RULE" DOES NOT APPLY
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INTRODUCTION

On May 5, 2006, a driver was stopped at the guard station
while exiting the United States Merchant Marine Academy at
Kings Point. The military guards approached, noticing that the
driver appeared to be intoxicated. When they tried to speak to
him, the driver sped off with one of the guards clinging to the car
door, the vehicle swerving into the oncoming lane of traffic. The
man was eventually stopped by the Kings Point Police and
arrested; he was later brought to a Nassau County drunk driver
testing location and, two hours and five minutes after his arrest,
refused to provide a breath sample to the police. The legal
question implicated by this case is whether a defendant's refusal
to consent to a Breathalyzer test,' when such refusal transpires
longer than two hours after his arrest, is admissible as evidence
against that defendant in a subsequent criminal trial for a
drunk-driving offense.
In the early 1980s, when big hair,
Member's Only jackets, and Pat Benatar were still popular, the
answer would have been "no."2 But many things have changed

since 1981. If Paris Hilton confronted this choice today, refusing
t Chief, Vehicular Crimes Bureau, Bronx County District Attorney's Office; New
York State Traffic Safety Resource Prosecutor; Adjunct Professor of Law, St. John's
University School of Law; Chair, NYSDAA Vehicular Crimes Legislation Committee.
tf The author was assisted by Timothy C. Stone, Assistant District Attorney,
Appeals Bureau, NY County District Attorney's Office; Executive Notes &
Comments Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D., cum laude, 2007, St. John's
University School of Law; B.A., cum laude, 2004, New York University.
I A Breathalyzer is "[a) device used to measure the blood alcohol content of a
person's breath." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (8th ed. 2004).
2 See People v. Brol, 81 A.D.2d 739, 438 N.Y.S.2d 424 (4th Dep't 1981),
modified, 89 A.D.2d 813, 453 N.Y.S.2d 540 (4th Dep't 1982).
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to blow more than two hours after her arrest, the refusal would
almost certainly be admissible at her trial. In fact, over the past
fourteen years virtually every New York court has held that no
such time limit for the admission of refusal evidence exists, a
conclusion supported by legislative history, statutory plain
meaning, and binding New York caselaw. Yet recently this issue
has arisen once again as an unlikely bone of judicial contention.
The genesis of the present disagreement was a pair of
aberrant 2005 trial court decisions, the holdings of which
seemingly turned back the clock and found that a two-hour lapse
between arrest and refusal renders such refusal inadmissible.
These cases relied on an overly-broad conception of the so-called
"two-hour rule" once prevalent in New York decisional law. This
Essay examines the language and history of the statutory
provision at issue, Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1194, in the
context of nearly two decades of New York caselaw. It concludes
that application of the two-hour rule to chemical test refusals is
simply not the law in New York ... nor should it be.
I.

REFUSALS UNDER VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW
SECTION 1194

Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") section 1194 establishes the
procedures governing the arrest and testing of an individual
suspected of driving while under the influence of drugs or
alcohol. As a result of a 1970 change to the enabling statute,
conflict emerged as to the current application of the two-hour
rule.
The original two-hour rule contained in VTL section 70(5)
provided that chemical evidence of the amount of alcohol in a
driver's blood was only admissible if the test was performed
within two hours of his arrest. This rule, as a matter of
construction, applied to the entire statute, serving as a "rule of
an evidentiary nature."3
In 1970, however, the New York
legislature changed the statutory placement of the two-hour rule,
relocating it from the VTL's evidentiary provision to its "deemed
4
consent" provision.
3 People v. Morales, 161 Misc. 2d 128, 130, 611 N.Y.S.2d 980, 981 (N.Y.C. Crim.
Ct. Kings County 1994).
4 The legislature moved the two-hour provision from VTL section 70(5), the
statutory predecessor to section 1195(1), and placed it within the "implied consent"
language of section 1194. Id. Note that, for the purposes of this essay, the terms
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This change removed the two-hour stricture from the
overarching statute which provided for admissibility of chemical
test evidence and wedded it with the statute which conferred
authority on police officers to obtain relevant evidence of
intoxication[, specifically] in cases where the police would have
to rely upon implied consent because of the driver's inability to
acquiesce in or refuse a chemical test.5

The only remnant of the two-hour rule, and, in fact, the only time
that the words "two hours" even appear in VTL section 1194, is
in section 1194(2)(a). 6 The statute is thus very straightforward:
When the deemed consent provision of section 1194 applies, a

chemical test analysis must be conducted within two hours of the
driver's arrest.
Failure to do so renders such evidence
inadmissible at trial. This two-hour prescription exists nowhere
else in the statute, dictating that its scope was likewise meant to
be limited to that provision.
In People v. Finnegan,7 finding the two-hour rule
inapplicable to independently performed chemical tests s the New
York Court of Appeals held that "[t]he governing rule of statutory
construction is that courts are obliged to interpret a statute to
effectuate the intent of the legislature, and when the statutory
'language is clear and unambiguous, it should be construed so as
to give effect to the plain meaning of [the] words' used." The
court further stated, "[w]e have firmly held that the failure of the
Legislature to include a substantive, significant prescription in a
statute is a strong indication that its exclusion was intended,"
"implied consent" and "deemed consent" are used interchangeably.
5 Morales, 161 Misc. 2d at 131, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 982 (emphasis added).
6 The statute states, in pertinent part:
Chemical tests. (a) When authorized.
Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to
have given consent to a chemical test ... at the direction of a police officer:
(1) having reasonable grounds to believe such person to have been
operating in violation of any subdivision of section eleven hundred
ninety-two of this article and within two hours after such person has
been placed under arrest for any such violation; or having reasonable
grounds to believe such person to have been operating in violation of
section eleven hundred ninety-two-a of this article and within two
hours after the stop of such person for any such violation,
(2) within two hours after a breath test, as provided in paragraph (b) of
subdivision one of this section, indicates that alcohol has been
consumed by such person ....
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1194(2) (McKinney 2007) (emphasis added).
7 85 N.Y.2d 53, 647 N.E.2d 758, 623 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1995).
8 See § 1194(4)(b); see also infra Part II.B.
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and that "the omission of ...substantive elements [from this]
fully integrated and comprehensive driving while intoxicated
protocol compellingly suggests that the Legislature intended no
such additional obligations."9
Pursuant to this logic, the omission of a two-hour component
from the refusal provision of an otherwise complete and
comprehensive "driving while intoxicated" ("DWI") section
demonstrates legislative intent to exempt refusals from the twohour rule. After all, "[i]t is a fundamental canon of statutory
construction that courts 'do not sit in review of the discretion of
the Legislature or determine the expediency, wisdom, or
propriety of its actions on matters within its powers.' "10
Examining other subsections of VTL section 1194 confirms
that the two-hour rule does not exist anywhere but within the
deemed consent provision. Outside of that provision, the statute
provides that upon refusal, "the test shall not be given and a
written report of such refusal shall be immediately made by the
police officer before whom such refusal was made."'1 The text
goes on to describe the necessary contents of such report, 12 the
fact that the license of the driver shall be suspended pending a
hearing, and the time by which notice of the refusal shall be sent
to the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles
("DMV"). 1 3 Furthermore, it sets forth in explicit detail the
procedural rules governing the DMV hearing, which is held once
a police officer files a written report stating that a driver refused
14
submission to chemical test analysis.
9 Finnegan,85 N.Y.2d at 58, 647 N.E.2d at 761, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 549; see also
People v. Tychanski, 78 N.Y.2d 909, 911-12, 577 N.E.2d 1046, 1047-48, 573
N.Y.S.2d 454, 455-56 (1991) (holding that where the language of Criminal
Procedure Law section 30.30(5)(c) omitted misdemeanor indictments from a list of

accusatory instruments that trigger a less-than-six-month speedy trial period, the
statute "must be read and given effect as it is written by the Legislature," noting
further that "the failure of the Legislature to include a matter within a particular
statute is an indication that its exclusion was intended," and therefore concluding
that the Legislature's failure was deliberate (internal quotation marks omitted)).
10 Pajak v. Pajak, 56 N.Y.2d 394, 397, 437 N.E.2d 1138, 1139, 452 N.Y.S.2d 381,
382 (1982) (quoting N.Y. STAT. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1982)).
11 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2)(b)(1).
12 Id. § 1194(2)(b)(2) ("The report of the police officer shall set forth reasonable
grounds to believe such arrested person... had refused to submit to such chemical
test, and that no chemical test was administered pursuant to the requirements of
subdivision three of this section.").
13 Id. § 1194(2)(b)(3).
14 See id. § 1194(2)(c).
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The VTL also provides that if a hearing is not conducted
within fifteen days after the driver's arraignment, his operating
privileges are reinstated pending the hearing. 15 VTL section
1194(2)(c) establishes that the determinations to be made at this
hearing are limited to whether: (1) the police officer had
reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was driving in
violation of VTL section 1192(1)-(4); (2) the officer lawfully
arrested the driver; (3) the driver was given sufficient warnings,
clearly and unequivocally, that test refusal would result in the
immediate suspension and subsequent revocation of the driver's
operating privilege, notwithstanding the driver's guilt or
innocence; and (4) the driver in fact refused to submit to the test.
The statute then addresses the only two available dispositions:
license restoration or revocation. VTL section 1194(2)(c) states
that if the hearing officer
finds on any one of said issues in the negative, [he] shall
immediately terminate any suspension arising from such
refusal. If, after such hearing, the hearing officer, acting on
behalf of the commissioner finds all of the issues in the
affirmative, such16 officer shall immediately revoke the license or
permit to drive.
The legislature's mandate to the DMV is as clear as day: If the
enumerated statutory criteria are met, the administrative law
judge has no other choice but to suspend the operator's privilege
to drive.
There is absolutely no mention of the two-hour rule in this
highly specific statutory subsection. The legislature carefully
defined the pertinent deadlines, stating that a refusal report
be sent to the commissioner within forty-eight hours of
arraignment,1 7 and that a hearing be conducted within fifteen
days of arraignment.1 8 If the legislature intended that a twohour rule apply to refusals, surely some mention of its existence
would appear in these statutory provisions. Yet, the fact remains
that there is no requirement, explicit or implied, that a driver's
refusal to submit to a chemical test be obtained within two hours
of arrest.

15 Id.

16 Id. (emphasis added).

17 Id. § 1194(2)(b)(3).
18 Id. § 1194(2)(c).
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VTL section 1194(2)(f) further provides:
Evidence of a refusal to submit to a chemical test or any portion

thereof shall be admissible in any trial, proceeding or
hearing.., but only upon a showing that the person was given
sufficient warning, in clear and unequivocal language, of the
effect of such refusal and that the person persisted in the
refusal.
The statute is once again clear: If a defendant is given the
requisite notice as to the consequences of his refusal, that refusal
is admissible at trial. Absent again is any mention of a two-hour
requirement.
Guided by the rules of statutory construction, plainly there is
no requirement in VTL section 1194(2)(b) that a refusal be
obtained within two hours of arrest in order for the refusal
evidence to be admissible at trial. When a provision is absent
from a statute, its exclusion by the legislature must be construed
as intentional, and it cannot be inserted by judicial decree.
II. THE RELUCTANCE OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS TO
EXPAND THE "Two-HOUR RULE" BEYOND DEEMED CONSENT

Despite the VTL's clarity as to this matter, caselaw from the
early 1980s bred confusion concerning the existence and
application of the two-hour rule. As this Essay demonstrates,
several New York Court of Appeals cases-culminating in People
v. Atkins-1 9-repudiate the incorrect, and yet lingering, contention
that a statutory time limit exists beyond which a driver's blood
alcohol test refusal is per se inadmissible. In this line of cases,
the court explicitly held that additional subsections in VTL
section 1194 are to be construed as written-i.e., without a twohour cap when such limit is absent from the pertinent statutory
provision.
The "Two-Hour Rule" Held Inapplicableto Court-Ordered
Chemical Tests
In People v. McGrath,20 the Second Department held that
chemical tests performed pursuant to court order are not subject
A.

19 85 N.Y.2d 1007, 654 N.E.2d 1213, 630 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1995).
20 135 A.D.2d 60, 524 N.Y.S.2d 214 (2d Dep't 1988), affd, 73 N.Y.2d 826, 534
N.E.2d 318, 537 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1988).
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to the two-hour limitation, or to any other time limit. 2 1 The
driver in McGrath was involved in a car accident that resulted in
serious injuries. A police officer asked him to consent to a blood
alcohol test several times, and each time the defendant refused.
The officer eventually obtained a court order, and two hours and
twenty minutes after the defendant was arrested a blood test was
performed. The court held:
Nothing in the unambiguous language of [current VTL section
1194(3)(b)] indicates that the Legislature intended to impose a
specific time limitation on the performance of court-ordered
chemical tests. The omission of such a restriction reflects a
rational legislative determination that it was unnecessary. It is
reasonable to assume that the intervention of an impartial
magistrate in the issuance of an order for a chemical test
insures that the test will not be administered at a time so
remote that the results are irrelevant to the central question of
the driver's blood-alcohol count at the time of the automobile
22
accident.
The court rejected the defendant's argument that the twohour rule was incorporated by reference into court-ordered
chemical tests: "If the legislature had intended for the two-hour
rule... to apply to chemical tests ordered by a court... it
certainly would have included an unequivocal statement to that
effect. ' 23 This explicit recognition of the legislature's failure to
incorporate the two-hour rule into the VTL's court-ordered test
provision reinforces the view that the two-hour rule applies only
when specifically mentioned.
The "Two-Hour Rule" Held Inapplicableto IndependentlyObtained Chemical Tests
In Finnegan, police arrested the defendant for driving while
intoxicated and informed him that, pursuant to VTL section
1194(4)(b), he possessed a right to an independent blood test
performed at his own expense. The defendant was given a
Breathalyzer test within two hours of his arrest, and was
The defendant
subsequently convicted of a DWI offense.
B.

21 The court did note that the "time for administering court-ordered chemical
tests is limited only by considerations of due process." Id. at 61, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
22 Id. at 62, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
23 Id. at 63, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 217; see also People v. Demetsenare, 243 A.D.2d
777, 780, 663 N.Y.S.2d 299, 302 (3d Dep't 1997) (noting that there is no two-hour
time limit in cases involving court-ordered blood tests).
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appealed, arguing that the police had an affirmative obligation to
assist him in obtaining an independent blood test. The court
rejected this assertion, 24 though noting that police should never
25
impede arrestees from procuring an independent test.
Noteworthy was the court's response to Mr. Finnegan's
contention that police assistance for conducting the independent
test be promptly offered, so that the test would be completed
within two hours of his arrest. The Court of Appeals held that
"[VTL] § 1194(2)(a)(1), which mandates that the [B]reathalyzer
test be performed within a two-hour time period following arrest,
That prerequisite is not
applies only to the official test.
referenced to the accused's independent test option nor is it
controlling with respect to the private, personal test."26 Finnegan
thus definitively held that "[n]othing in the unambiguous
language of [VTL] § 1194(4)(b) indicates that the Legislature
intended to cross-reference or incorporate the official test time
limitation into obtaining the independent test."27 As a result, the
two-hour rule does not apply to independent tests, the results of
which are admissible despite the lapse of more than two hours.
This holding again strengthens the argument that test refusals

24 The defendant in Finnegan wanted the court to: (1) require the police to
advise defendants of their right to an independent test; (2) require police to

transport defendants to a hospital or make provisions for a technician to appear at
the precinct; and (3) require the police to obtain the independent test within two
hours of defendants' arrests. 85 N.Y.2d at 57, 647 N.E.2d at 760, 623 N.Y.S.2d at
548. The court, finding the statute "starkly silent as to any implementary duties
imposed on the law enforcement personnel," held that the "statutory right is the
defendant's and so is the responsibility to take advantage of it," and thus refused to
require any affirmative police action. Id. at 58, 647 N.E.2d at 760-61, 623 N.Y.S.2d
at 548-49.
25 Id. at 58, 647 N.E.2d at 761, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 549. The court did note that
while police should assist those in custody by providing telephone calls, etc., "the
police have no affirmative duty to gather or help gather evidence for an accused." Id.
at 58, 647 N.E.2d at 761, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 549 (citing People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d
375, 515 N.E.2d 898, 521 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1987)).
26 Id. at 59, 647 N.E.2d at 761, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 549. Note that this opinion,
written in February of 1995, still applied the two-hour rule within section
1194(2)(a)(1), despite the defendant's consent to the Breathalyzer test. As discussed
in Part I.C, infra, the two-hour rule only applies to situations of so-called "deemed
consent." People v. Atkins, 85 N.Y.2d 1007, 1008-09, 654 N.E.2d 1213, 1214, 630
N.Y.S.2d 965, 966 (1995), decided four months after Finnegan,conclusively held the
two-hour rule inapplicable to cases in which the driver expressly consents to a
chemical test.
27 Finnegan, 85 N.Y.2d at 59, 647 N.E.2d at 761, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
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remain valid despite the passage of more than two hours from
the time of arrest.
The "Two-HourRule" Held Inapplicable When a Defendant
Expressly Consents to a Chemical Test
In People v. Atkins, 28 the defendant was charged with
violating VTL section 1192(4) after colliding with a parked
vehicle. He consented to a blood test, which was conducted two
hours and twenty-eight minutes after his arrest. 29 The test
results confirmed the presence of phencyclidine ("PCP") in the
defendant's bloodstream.
The Atkins opinion cited to People v. Ward,30 in which the
Court of Appeals found it "difficult to perceive any necessity for
the protections embodied in [the deemed consent statute] where
the driver freely volunteers to take the test and have his blood
analyzed." 31 Atkins then held, "[i]t follows from our decision in
Ward that the two-hour limitation contained in [VTL]
§ 1194(2)(a) has no application here where, as found by the
Appellate Term, [the] defendant expressly32 and voluntarily
consented to administration of the blood test."
Thus, while the Court of Appeals has not yet squarely faced
the question of refusal evidence admissibility after two hours, in
every relevant decision addressing VTL section 1194, it has
refused to expand the scope of the two-hour rule beyond the
deemed consent provision. This refusal to apply a time limit
when addressing VTL subsections beyond the deemed consent
provision clearly implies that if the Court of Appeals ever
confronts this issue, it will not subject test refusal admissibility
to a two-hour rule.
C.

28

85 N.Y.2d 1007, 654 N.E.2d 1213, 630 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1995).

Id. at 1008, 654 N.E.2d at 1214, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
307 N.Y. 73, 120 N.E.2d 211 (1954).
31 Atkins, 85 N.Y.2d at 1008, 654 N.E.2d at 1214, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 966 (quoting
Ward, 307 N.Y. at 77, 120 N.E.2d at 213 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
32 Id. at 1008-09, 654 N.E.2d at 1214, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
29
30
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III. PEOPLE V. BROL: THE ORIGIN AND MOST PROMINENT
MISAPPLICATION OF THE "Two-HOUR RULE"

A.

Brol's Holding: FundamentallyFlawed and Obsolete

People v. Brol,3 3 decided in 1981, is widely viewed as the
most significant case to posit the potential inadmissibility of a
refusal that occurs more than two hours after a defendant's
arrest. Ironically, the Fourth Department in Brol actually
remanded the case back to the trial court in order to ascertain
the timing of the refusal.3 4 As it turns out, Mr. Brol refused the
chemical test within two hours of his arrest. 35 Thus, the entire
appellate analysis was unnecessary, and its pronouncement as to
the two-hour rule can fairly be considered dicta. Regardless of
that salient history, Brol is the foundation for the widespread
It is
misapplication of the two-hour rule to test refusals.
therefore instructive to examine the decision's reasoning, history,
treatment, and interpretation over the last twenty-six years.
Brol held that a chemical test not performed within two
hours after the driver's arrest would be inadmissible at trial.
The court then expanded upon this holding, stating that "if the
test's results are incompetent if ...not administered within the
two-hour limit, [then] evidence of the refusal is similarly
incompetent ...against defendant unless obtained within two
hours of the arrest." 36 Brol's conclusions are, however, clearly
unsound in light of subsequent caselaw. As discussed above, the
Court of Appeals has since determined that test results obtained
more than two hours after a driver's arrest are indeed admissible
when obtained either through voluntary consent, court order, or
at a defendant's request; Brol's underlying premise is,
resultingly, based on an incorrect assessment of New York law.
Notably, employing Brol's logic-a post-two-hour result lacks
probative value and is therefore inadmissible, and, assuming the
evidentiary significance of a refusal is directly linked to the
propriety of its precedent request, a post-two-hour refusal also
lacks probative value and is likewise inadmissible-leads to the

33 81 A.D.2d 739, 438 N.Y.S.2d 424 (4th Dep't 1981), modified, 89 A.D.2d 813,
453 N.Y.S.2d 540 (4th Dep't 1982).
34 Id. at 740, 438 N.Y.S. at 425.
35 People v. Brol, 89 A.D.2d 813, 813, 453 N.Y.S.2d 540, 541 (4th Dep't 1982).
36 Brol, 81 A.D.2d at 740, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
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conclusion that if the court's first holding 37 is misguided, its
second pronouncement 38 is also wrong. Brol's first prong, that
the VTL requires a breath test be administered within two hours
of arrest, has been directly overruled by a plethora of New York
cases. 39 Therefore, if a post-two-hour breath test is admissible, a
post-two-hour refusal is "similarly" competent and admissible. In
other words, the evidentiary validity of a post-two-hour test
result yields the evidentiary validity of a post-two-hour test
refusal. It is only through the application of this simple logical
construct that the past thirteen years of New York caselaw
makes any sense. Examining the judicial treatment of Brol since
1994, most courts have indeed reached this very conclusion and
admitted evidence of such refusals. Crucially, these decisions
40
have done so despite acknowledging, and even discussing, Brol.
Lower Court Caselaw in the Wake of Brol
The first widely cited refusal case to follow Brol was People
v. Walsh,41 which adhered to Brol's dictate without comment or
The Walsh court's complete deference to Brol is
question.
unsurprising when viewed in the context of the evolving caselaw
at the time, which still largely applied the two-hour cap to all
chemical tests and, by extension, to all refusals. This view
predominated despite the legislative changes noted above, and it
B.

37 The statutory interpretation of the VTL required a person's breath to be
gathered within two hours of arrest. Id. at 740, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 424-25; see also
supra note 36 and accompanying text.
38 Namely, the application of this concept to refusals.
39 See People v. Finnegan, 85 N.Y.2d 53, 59, 647 N.E.2d 758, 761, 623 N.Y.S.2d
546, 549 (1995); People v. Atkins, 85 N.Y.2d 1007, 1008-09, 654 N.E.2d 1213, 121314, 630 N.Y.S.2d 965, 965-66 (1995); People v. Hoffman, 283 A.D.2d 928, 929, 725
N.Y.S.2d 494, 497 (4th Dep't 2001); People v. Zawacki, 244 A.D.2d 954, 955, 665
N.Y.S.2d 172, 173 (4th Dep't 1997); People v. Turner, 234 A.D.2d 704, 706, 651
N.Y.S.2d 655, 657 (3d Dep't 1996); People v. Abel, 166 A.D.2d 841, 841-42, 563
N.Y.S.2d 531, 532 (3d Dep't 1990); People v. McGrath, 135 A.D.2d 60, 62, 524
N.Y.S.2d 214, 216 (2d Dep't 1988), affld, 73 N.Y.2d 826, 534 N.E.2d 318, 537
N.Y.S.2d 480 (1988); People v. Nemickas, 5 Misc. 3d 133(A), 799 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Sup.
Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 2004) (table decision); People v. Byington, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 8,
1989, at 21, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 732, 557
N.E.2d 1190, 558 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1990).
40 See, e.g., People v. Morales, 161 Misc. 2d 128, 129, 611 N.Y.S.2d 980, 983
(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Kings County 1994).
41 139 Misc. 2d 161, 527 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1988). Judge
Jonas, author of the Walsh opinion, did reference People v. Mills, 124 A.D.2d 600,
507 N.Y.S.2d 743 (2d Dep't 1988), a precursor to Atkins.
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was not until cases like People v. Mills42 and McGrath that a
43
much narrower conception of the two-hour rule arose.
Moreover, it was not until 1995, when Finniganand Atkins were
decided by the New York Court of Appeals, that caselaw truly
reflected the 1970 legislative change. When Walsh was decided,
consequently, misperceptions still existed as to the two-hour
rule's scope.
The next pertinent decision was People v. Morales,44 a 1994
decision that focused on the incompatibility between Brol and
Mills. In contrast to Walsh's perfunctory analysis, the Morales
court fully examined the relevant legislative and judicial changes
47
46
since 1970, 45 including Brol, Walsh, and People v. Mertz.

42

124 A.D.2d 600, 507 N.Y.S.2d 743 (2d Dep't 1986).

43 Legislatively, the two-hour rule applies only when the prosecution relies on

statutorily

deemed

consent to introduce a breath test result at trial. That

circumstance generally occurs only when an operator is unconscious or incoherent,
and the police request medical personnel to take a blood sample.
44 161 Misc. 2d 128, 611 N.Y.S.2d 980 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Kings County 1994).
45 See id. at 130-34, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 981-84 ("The two-hour rule had its genesis
in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 70(5) .... ). The court discussed the 1970 legislative
realignment of the two-hour rule into the implied consent provision of the VTL,
calling it a "telling development." Id. at 130, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 981. This change
"wedded [the two-hour stricture] with the statute which conferred authority on
police officers to obtain relevant evidence of intoxication in cases where the police
would have to rely upon implied consent because of the driver's inability to acquiesce
in or refuse a chemical test." Id. at 131, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 982. The organizational
structure of VTL section 1194, the court reasoned, "segregated" the three methods
through which police can obtain chemical test evidence: implied consent, express
consent, and court orders. Id. Morales then summarized the relevant appellate
division caselaw from the 1980s, identifying the gradual yet irrefutable constriction
of the two-hour rule's scope to only those cases involving implied consent. Id. at 13132, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 982-83 (discussing People v. Abel, 166 A.D.2d 841, 563 N.Y.S.2d
531 (3d Dep't 1990), People v. Mills, 124 A.D.2d 600, 507 N.Y.S.2d 743 (2d Dep't
1986), and People v. Kates, 53 N.Y.2d 591, 428 N.E.2d 852, 444 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1981)).
The court emphasized the Second Department's extension of this underlying
rationale to court-ordered chemical tests in People v. McGrath, 135 A.D.2d 60, 524
N.Y.S.2d 214 (2d Dep't 1988), aff'd, 73 N.Y.2d 826, 534 N.E.2d 318, 537 N.Y.S.2d
480 (1988), the Court of Appeals' affirmation of which validated the transformation
of "the two-hour rule from one of evidentiary significance to one of procedural
consequence." Morales, 161 Misc. 2d at 132, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 982 ("The rule no longer
has evidentiary significance because chemical test results obtained more than two
hours after a defendant's arrest by express consent or court order are now
admissible.").
46 The court identified Walsh's reliance on Brol as illogical: "[I]f an officer,
pursuant to [VTL] § 1194(2)(b), has the authority to request that a driver take a
chemical test more than two hours after the arrest, and the test results are deemed
probative, why is a defendant's refusal to take the authorized test nctu probative of a
consciousness of guilt?" 161 Misc. 2d at 133, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 983. The opinion
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Judge Garnett, author of the Morales opinion, felt bound by the
Second Department's ruling in Mills to allow evidence of a
refusal made after two hours into evidence. 48 Additionally, he
presaged future Court of Appeals holdings 49 by emphasizing that
the two-hour rule was not evidentiary but procedural,50 a
distinction nevertheless still ignored by some commentators
today. That Walsh and Morales reached contrary conclusions is
at least partly attributable to a change in the general perception
among New York courts as to the two-hour rule, a shift that
occurred during the period of time in between those two
decisions. By the time Morales came about, several opinions in
various departments had already followed Mills. 5 1 In any event,
Morales examined the proper scope of the two-hour rule in depth,
conclusively holding that a chemical test refusal need not
transpire within two hours from arrest to be admissible.
A year after Morales, Judge Ruchelsman in People v.
Coludro52 found the two-hour rule inapplicable to refusals
without referencing any cases beside Morales.53 This direct

concluded that "Walsh is at odds with the binding statutory interpretation in Mills
and inconsistent with the underlying reasoning of Brol." Id. (citations omitted).
47 68 N.Y.2d 136, 497 N.E.2d 657, 506 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1986). Mertz found that
"proof of a [B]reathalyzer reading of .10 or more within two hours after arrest
establishes prima facie a violation of [VTL] § 1192(2)." Id. at 146, 497 N.E.2d at 662,
506 N.Y.S.2d at 295. Judge Garnett in Morales rejected any argument that Mertz's
holding demonstrated the applicability of the two-hour rule to cases involving
express consent and court orders: "[Tihe Court was not applying a statutory
presumption contained in the language of section 1192(2), but was, at most,
fashioning a common-law rule to aid the prosecution in establishing a prima facie
case." 161 Misc. 2d at 133, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
48 Brol is not binding on these lower courts because its reasoning lacks a basis
in the plain meaning of the statutory language governing the law of refusals and is
based on a conclusion since refuted by the Court of Appeals. If Brol in fact
determined that the VTL required a refusal within two hours of arrest to permit
admissibility, then all trial courts would need to adhere to this rule until either a
court of concurrent or higher authority ruled differently or until the legislature took
action. But, as noted above, that was not Brol's holding. See supra text
accompanying notes 36-37.
49 See supra Part II.B-C (addressing People v. Atkins and People v. Finnegan).
50 Morales, 161 Misc. 2d at 134, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
51 See People v. Stelmach, 191 A.D.2d 733, 595 N.Y.S.2d 509 (2d Dep't 1993);
People v. Abel, 166 A.D.2d 841, 563 N.Y.S.2d 531 (3d Dep't 1990); People v.
Byington, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 8, 1989, at 21, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't), appeal
denied, 76 N.Y.2d 732, 557 N.E.2d 1190, 558 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1990).
52 166 Misc. 2d 662, 634 N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Kings County 1995).
53 One possible explanation is that Judge Garnett's analysis was so well
reasoned and persuasive as to be irrefutable.
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reliance reflected two influential Court of Appeals decisions that
came down earlier that same year: Finnigan and Atkins. Just as
the Morales court had envisioned, these two cases removed any
and all force from Brol.54

By the time Judge Ruchelman

considered the issue in October of 1995, it was painstakingly
clear that the two-hour rule did not apply to evidence of test
refusals.
In 1996, People v. Cosgrove55 provided yet another pertinent
analysis, holding that "[t]his area of case law has progressed
since Brol was decided in 1981."56 The court emphasized Atkins,

adhered to Morales, and expressly rejected any claim that the
two-hour rule was applicable to cases other than those involving
57
deemed consent.
Two years later, People v. Ward58 also held the two-hour rule
inapplicable to test refusals. The court observed:
[Clonsidering the reasoning in Brol, in conjunction with several
subsequent decisions interpreting the scope of the two hour
rule, it seems clear that today the rule has no application in a
determination of the admissibility of evidence that a defendant
refused a chemical test .... In view of the foregoing decisions,

particularly People v. Atkins, the premise upon which the
Fourth Department relied in reaching its conclusion in People v.
Brol, specifically, that test results are universally incompetent
if the test is not administered within the two hour limit, is no
longer valid. That being so, the conclusion itself, that evidence
of a refusal not obtained within two hours is similarly
incompetent, is unsupported. Indeed, logic now dictates a
converse theorem: if evidence of the results of a chemical test
expressly consented to by a defendant and administered beyond
the two hour limit is competent, then evidence of a refusal to
take such a test, obtained beyond the two-hour limit, must
59
similarly be competent.
Ward, like Morales, reflected the broader consensus among
New York courts as to the two-hour rule. While aberrant

54 Ironically, Justice Simons, a member of the Fourth Department panel that
decided Brol in 1981, wrote the dissent in Atkins. Clearly, Justice Simons's
interpretation of the VTL has not been adopted in New York.
55 No. 95X052915, slip op. (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx County 1996).
56 Id. at 6.
57 Id. at 6.
58
59

176 Misc. 2d 398, 673 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1998).
Id. at 402-03, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 300-01 (citations omitted).
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decisions addressing issues surrounding Atkins do indeed exist,60
the concept that the two-hour rule applies only in the context of
deemed consent was finally accepted by most lower courts. The
driving force behind this consensus was that the Court of
Appeals had spoken: The two-hour rule was only applicable
when a prosecutor relies upon the deemed consent provision to
introduce a blood test gathered from an incoherent or
unconscious defendant.
Finally, People v. Torres6 1 quietly followed precedent in
ruling that the two-hour limit does not apply to refusals. Six
years after Ward, and with not a single published appeal finding
fault with the admission of refusal evidence gathered after two
hours, Torres adhered to the correct statutory and case-driven
62
analysis, admitting the refusal evidence at issue.
The caselaw therefore has developed in a linear fashion.
Courts have consistently held that the two-hour rule does not
apply to test refusals. 63 In fact, Walsh had never been cited in a
published opinion to validate the suppression of a post-two-hour
refusal-that is, until 2005 in People v. Kenny. 64 Additionally, no
other published decision has followed Walsh's analysis except
People v. Morris,65 coincidentally also decided in 2005 by the
same court that decided Kenny. Even more remarkably, in the
twenty-six years since Brol was decided, Walsh in 1988 and now
Morris and Kenny constitute the only times in which Brol has
60 See People v. Victory, 166 Misc. 2d 549, 631 N.Y.S.2d 805 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct.
Kings County 1995); People v. Ali, 151 Misc. 2d 742, 573 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y.C. Crim.
Ct. N.Y. County 1991); People v. Sesman, 137 Misc. 2d 676, 521 N.Y.S.2d 626

(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx County 1987).
61 No. 2004QN014464, 2004 WL 2339812 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Queens County Oct.
4, 2004) (unpublished table decision).
62 Id. at *1. The court simply cited to Ward, Atkins, and Morales. Id.
63 Note, however, that it may be argued that the First Department's decision in
People v. Iovino, 39 A.D.3d 311, 835 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1st Dep't 2007), suggests that the
two-hour limit might still apply to refusals in some cases. Here, the court confirmed
an administrative order revoking the petitioner's driver's license. Petitioner argued
that his refusal was not valid because it came longer than two hours after his arrest,
but the court rejected this contention, finding that the driver's "refusal clearly took
place within two hours of his arrest." Id. at 312, 835 N.Y.S.2d at 37. The Brief filed
by the Attorney General did not argue that a refusal that occurs after two hours is
admissible, instead taking the position that the refusal occurred within two hours.
Thus, the issue was not truly addressed or decided.
64 No. 2005R1001023, 2005 WL 2148893, at *3 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Richmond
County Sept. 6, 2005) (unpublished table decision).
65 8 Misc. 3d 360, 364, 793 N.Y.S.2d 754, 757 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Richmond
County 2005).
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been cited in support of a post-two-hour refusal suppression. 66 A
closer look at Morris and Kenny is thus warranted.
C.

People v. Morris and People v. Kenny: Brol's Latest Spawn Is
Fundamentally Bad Law
In People v. Morris,67 the central issue was police failure to

66 Not one other reported case in twenty-six years ruled a refusal inadmissible
based on Brol. Nineteen decisions cited Brol but addressed cases in which a test
result was gathered. Eleven of those cases were decided before Atkins in 1995, and
therefore either followed Brol or, alternatively, did not address the issue. Seven of
the remaining eight cases were decided post-Atkins and, as a result, did not follow
Brol. The one remaining post-Atkins opinion, People v. Victory, briefly mentioned
Brol but was silent as to its treatment. See 166 Misc. 2d at 555, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
Of the nine decisions that involved actual refusals, one predated Atkins and thus
sided with Brol but remanded the case for a factual determination as to the actual
time of refusal. People v. Howard, N.Y. L.J., May 25, 1989, at 30, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.
App. T. 2d Dep't). Two of the remaining eight did not concern refusals occurring
beyond two hours from arrest, People v. Paggi, No. CR 03554-2004, 2005 WL
1572203, at *3 (Long Beach City Ct. July 1, 2005) (unpublished table decision);
People. v. Cruz, 134 Misc. 2d 115, 116, 509 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1003 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct.
N.Y. County 1986), and three disagreed with Brol, People v. Ward, 176 Misc. 2d 398,
401-02, 673 N.Y.S.2d 297, 300 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1998); People v. Cosgrove,
No. 95X052915, slip op. at 5-6 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx County May 6, 1996); People
v. Morales, 161 Misc. 2d 128, 135-36, 611 N.Y.S.2d 980, 984 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Kings
County 1994), while three followed Brol. As stated, those three are Walsh in 1988,
and now Morris and Kenny in 2005. As previously noted, even Brol itself did not
render inadmissible the refusal at issue since it ultimately was found to have
transpired less than two hours after the defendant's arrest.
67 8 Misc. 3d 360, 793 N.Y.S.2d 754 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Richmond County 2005).
Morris, ironically, was a DMV administrative law judge. Stopped as he approached a
toll booth on the Staten Island side of the Verrazano Narrows Bridge, he refused to
submit to both field sobriety and alco-sensor tests. The police officer thereafter
arrested Morris without warning him that refusal to take the test would result in
the loss of his driver's license (a fact which, given the defendant's occupation, he
most certainly already knew). After a two-hour delay during which the arresting
officer counted toll money, Morris was brought to the local precinct; police first
informed the defendant that more than two hours had passed since the arrest, and
then again requested that he submit to a chemical test. Morris replied in the
negative, and the officer responded that his license would consequently be
suspended. Morris then asked: "There would be no penalty after two hours?"; the
officer answered, "[t]hat is correct, there will be a criminal penalty." Morris then
again refused the test. Id. at 361-63, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 755-56 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The Morris court clearly viewed the defendant as the victim of sloppy and
irresponsible police work, emphasizing the needless two-hour delay and the
ambiguous warning. See id. at 365, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 758 ("[W]e deal with a refusal
after the two hour period has tolled based upon police error and folly. Clearly, VTL
§ 1194 was not meant to protect incompetent police officers who dally in their effort
to bring a defendant to the police station."). Viewed in this light, Morris's legal
analysis is somewhat result-oriented, rejecting precedent and statutory authority in
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give the defendant sufficient warnings as to the consequences of
his chemical test refusal. As such, the government never even
argued the two-hour issue. Perhaps on this account, Morris is at
times unclear and confusing. For instance, one thrust of its
analysis is that breath tests gathered after two hours are
scientifically unreliable and legally inadmissible.
These
propositions are both incorrect. A breath test is a reliable
indicator of a person's blood alcohol content ("BAC") at the time
of the test,68 and post-two-hour results are uniformly
admissible-that is, with the exception of those cases involving
69
deemed consent.
order to reach a specific outcome the court perceived as just.
An inclination on the court's part to punish the state for perceived police
misconduct was also present in People v. Kenny, 2005 WL 2148893. In explaining the
case's facts, the opinion noted that one officer, speaking into a video camera in the
police station's Intoxicated Drivers Testing Unit room, glanced at his wrist watch
and stated the time as 8:45 p.m. Id. at *2. Given that the defendant was arrested
earlier that evening at 6:54 p.m., id. at *1, a test result or refusal occurring at 8:45
p.m. would withstand application of the two-hour admissibility rule. Yet at a later
hearing, the court found that the actual time of the refusal, as indicated by a
contemporaneously filled out police form, was 9:45 p.m., more than two hours after
the time of arrest. Id. at *2. Although never explicitly stated, the facts clearly
suggest that the court felt the officer lied into the camera about the time of the
refusal in order to satisfy what he believed to be a two-hour restraint. One also
draws this inference from the tone of a nearby footnote: "It is interesting to note that
the People did not ask the court to view the video tape after introducing it into
evidence. However, the court, sua sponte, viewed the tape." Id. at *2 n.3.
68 See People v. Donaldson, 36 A.D.2d 37, 40, 319 N.Y.S.2d 172, 176 (4th Dep't
1971) (affirming a drunk-driving conviction that relied on the admissibility of a
Breathalyzer test, and declaring that "we think the time has come when [we] may
recognize the general reliability of the Breathalyzer as a device for measuring the
concentration of alcohol in the blood, and that it is not necessary to require expert
testimony as to the nature, function or scientific principles underlying it .. "); see
also People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375, 380, 515 N.E.2d 898, 900, 521 N.Y.S.2d 212,
214 (1987) (stating that the court "recently ... reaffirmed [its] long-standing
conclusion that 'the scientific reliability of [B]reathalyzers in general is no longer
open to question'" (quoting People v. Mertz, 68 N.Y.2d 136, 148, 497 N.E.2d 657,
663, 506 N.Y.S.2d 290, 296 (1986))); People v. Gower, 42 N.Y.2d 117, 121, 366
N.E.2d 69, 71, 397 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370 (1977) (declaring that, with respect to
Breathalyzers, "reliability has been demonstrated and the results of such testing
where properly performed are universally accepted").
69 See People v. Atkins, 85 N.Y.2d 1007, 1008-09, 654 N.E.2d 1213, 1214, 630
N.Y.S.2d 965, 966 (1995) (validating post-two-hour chemical test results obtained
through express consent); People v. Finnegan, 85 N.Y.2d 53, 59, 647 N.E.2d 758,
761, 623 N.Y.S.2d 546, 549 (1995) (upholding the admissibility of post-two-hour
results obtained through private tests); People v. McGrath, 135 A.D.2d 60, 61, 524
N.Y.S.2d 214, 215 (2d Dep't 1988) (declaring that post-two-hour chemical tests
performed pursuant to court orders are valid at trial), affl'd, 73 N.Y.2d 826, 534
N.E.2d 318, 537 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1988).
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Regarding the issue of scientific reliability, Morris cites to a
statement made by a New York Assemblyman sixty-five years ago
asserting that a breath test must be administered within two
hours for its results to be probative. Since then science has cured
polio, smallpox, and cholera, and is working on cancer; the
understanding of breath testing for alcohol has likewise
improved.
Unquestionably, a breath test is presently a
scientifically reliable indicator of a person's BAC at the time of
the test. Equally obvious is that some delay always exists
between driving and testing, during which BAC usually
decreases 7 0 -an inference flowing from the fact that human
beings "sober up" when they stop drinking alcohol. 71 Not
surprisingly, results of chemical tests administered as long as
seven hours or more after vehicular operation have been found
admissible at trial. 72 There is simply no magical moment at
70 Typically, a breath test result higher than the legal limit would be used on its
own at trial, while a prosecutor may decide to add expert testimony when using a
breath test administered so long after vehicular operation that BAC, as measured,
has fallen below the legal limit.
71 See generally People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d 419, 427-28, 399 N.E.2d 513, 517,
423 N.Y.S.2d 625, 629 (1979) (discussing the definition of intoxication and noting
that a layman should be able to determine the indicia of intoxication). Common
sense dictates that a defendant with a BAC of .12 five hours after his arrest-taking
into account an officer's observation of intoxication at the time of operation, in
addition to the near certainty that the defendant was not drinking alcohol while in
police custody-was clearly well above .08 BAC at the time of driving.
72 See People v. O'Connor, 290 A.D.2d 519, 520, 738 N.Y.S.2d 55, 56 (2d Dep't
2002) (upholding the admission of retrograde extrapolation testimony concerning
blood that was withdrawn from the defendant roughly seven hours after a car
accident); People v. Stiffier, 237 A.D.2d 753, 753-54, 655 N.Y.S.2d 139, 139-40 (3d
Dep't 1997) (affirming admission of Breathalyzer test results obtained more than six
hours after the defendant's operation of a vehicle as basis for application of
retrograde extrapolation); see also People v. Dombrowski-Bove, 300 A.D.2d 1122,
1123, 753 N.Y.S.2d 259, 260 (4th Dep't 2002) (holding as properly admitted the
opinion testimony of a pharmacologist who made a reverse extrapolation of the
defendant's BAC at the time of the incident); People v. Cross, 273 A.D.2d 702, 703,
711 N.Y.S.2d 533, 534 (3d Dep't 2000) ("[P]roper foundation was laid for [the
prosecution expert's] testimony in the area of retrograde extrapolation of alcohol in
the blood."); People v. MacDonald, 227 A.D.2d 672, 674-75, 641 N.Y.S.2d 749, 751
(2d Dep't 1996) (holding that a forensic toxicologist could opine as to the defendant's
BAC at the time of the accident despite the defendant's contention that such reverse
extrapolation testimony was improper, "since a proper foundation was laid by the
[government], the doctor qualified as an expert in his field, and his testimony was
properly submitted to the jury for them to accept or reject"), af'd, 89 N.Y.2d 908, 675
N.E.2d 1219, 653 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1996). In People v. Mertz, ironically, it was the
defense's argument that retrograde extrapolation testimony should have been
admitted which required reversal of the conviction. 68 N.Y.2d 136, 141-42, 497
N.E.2d 657, 659, 506 N.Y.S.2d 290, 292 (1986).
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which the scientifically probative nature of this kind of evidence
abruptly disappears. As shown by the lack of corresponding time
limits for consent, warrant-based, and personal testing pursuant
to Atkins, McGrath, and Finnegan, respectively, admissibility is
not dictated by the clock, but rather by the standard governing
the admission of any and all trial evidence: relevance. Still, if the
facts warrant it, New York caselaw has long permitted a
defendant to challenge the natural inference that a person-still
drunk after driving-was drunk when driving. Yet regardless of
such potential defenses, BACs determined several hours after
cessation of drinking-as noted above-are frequently admitted
as "probative, competent or relevant, i.e., scientifically
73
acceptable."
Legal admissibility has also been established.
Atkins,
Finnigan, and McGrath are all controlling on this issue, and yet
Morris ignored these precedents in concluding that 'VTL § 1192
is both evidentiary and procedural. ''74 Morris's analysis is thus
fatally flawed. As to lower court decisions, the opinion referenced
Ward but ignored the numerous others allowing post-two-hour
refusal admissibility. It cited to Victory repeatedly, yet that
court in fact found itself bound by Atkins to admit breath test
results gathered after two hours. 75 The fact is that the Court of
Appeals in Atkins stated in clear and unequivocal terms:
The Defendant's contention that the two-hour limitation in
section 1194(2)(a) was intended by the Legislature to be an
absolute rule of relevance, proscribing admission of the results
73 People v. Victory, 166 Misc. 2d 549, 556, 631 N.Y.S.2d 805, 810 (N.Y.C. Crim.
Ct. Kings County 1995); see also supra note 72 and accompanying text (listing
caselaw).
74 People v. Morris, 8 Misc. 3d 360, 366, 793 N.Y.S.2d 754, 758 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct.
Richmond County 2005). Astonishingly, while predominantly ignoring the appellate
decisions most on point, Morris mentioned People v. Mills, 124 A.D.2d 600, 507
N.Y.S.2d 743 (2d Dep't 1986), distinguishing it on the basis that Mills actually
concerned a blood test that was gathered within two hours, rather than a breath test
refusal. See id. at 365, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 758 ("Mills stands for the proposition that
the requirement that the blood sample must be obtained within two hours after
arrest, unless an express manifestation of consent has been given."). This seems
oddly appropriate given that the refusal in Brol actually occurred within two hours.
Ultimately, the salient point is that because Mills validated the admissibility of
post-two-hour blood test results obtained via express consent, the Brol analytical
model-afforded absolute deference by the Morris court-should dictate that similar
breath test refusals likewise be found admissible.
75 Victory, 166 Misc. 2d at 565, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
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of any chemical test administered after that period regardless of
the nature of the driver's consent, is unpersuasive. This
argument is completely undermined by the lack of a
corresponding time limit for court-ordered chemical testing
under section 1194(3) or the additional test which the driver
must be permitted to have administered
by a physician of his or
76
her choosing under section 1194(4)(b).

Morris entirely overlooked or disregarded this reasoning. As
noted above, the court instead cited to sixty-five-year-old
legislative history. And, in the end, the bulk of Morris's language
and ideas is traceable back through Victory to the Atkins's
dissent. Thus, the position taken in Morris had already been
definitively rejected by the New York Court of Appeals.
The other disturbing thread running though Morris is the
court's inference of "gamesmanship" on the part of the police in
delaying the chemical test. Such an accusation is not only
unsupported by the facts of the case, but is also largely
nonsensical. While test results and refusals remain admissible
beyond two hours after arrest, delays usually allow a drunk
driver's body to destroy or diminish evidence of intoxication. As
time passes, the body metabolizes more and more alcohol;
typically, the longer it takes to conduct a test, the lower a
defendant's BAC will be. Delays therefore normally benefit a
defendant and, consequently, that delay should lead to
suppression on account of its supposed prejudicial effect is
unconvincing.
Kenny largely followed Morris, only adding the contention
that post-two-hour test results are inadmissible due to New York
State Department of Health Regulations. 77 This assertion is
unpersuasive in light of its absence from the New York
jurisprudence addressing the matter.
Kenny's rationale in
applying the health regulations was that "[t]he applicable Health
Rules and Regulation mandated in connection with the two-hour
rule have been held to have 'definite authority' in this area, by
both the Third and Fourth Departments of the Appellate
Division."7 8 Of the cases on which Kenny relied, People v. Hampe
76

People v. Atkins, 85 N.Y.2d 1007, 1009, 654 N.E.2d 1213, 1214, 630 N.Y.S.2d

965, 966 (1995) (citations omitted).
77
No. 2005R1001023, 2005 WL 2148893, at *2 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Richmond
County Sept. 6, 2005).
78 Id. at *3 (citing People v. Hampe, 181 A.D.2d 238, 240-41, 585 N.Y.S.2d 861,
862-63 (3d Dep't 1992); People v. Boyst, 177 A.D.2d 962, 962, 577 N.Y.S.2d 1007,
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involved judicial acceptance of the BAC Verifier breath testing
instrument on account of its approval by the New York State
Department of Health, 79 People v. McDonough concerned the
Health Department's definition of the method for blood alcohol
measurement,8 0 and People v. Boyst addressed police failure to
add an anticoagulant to a defendant's blood sample, referencing
Health Department rules to show that the sample would remain
admissible. 81 These cases have absolutely nothing to do with the
In fact, McDonough even rejected the
"two-hour rule."
defendant's proffered interpretation of the Health Department
definition as conflicting with the VTL, implying that the latter
should guide. 82 McDonough thus recognized that the VTL--as
construed by the Court of Appeals-takes precedence over
discrepant Health Department regulations. This certainly helps
explain why no other opinions share this facet of Kenny's
reasoning.
Kenny ultimately acknowledged the admissibility of breath
tests administered after two hours if a subject gives express
Yet the opinion then adopted an entirely new
consent. 83
its claim of refusal inadmissibility, reasoning that
for
foundation
the defendant was not given appropriate warnings of the changed
circumstances accompanying the expiration of two hours from
arrest, despite previously conceding that nothing in fact changed
after two hours. 84 The reality is that a drunk-driver normally
has two choices: blow or don't blow. If a defendant consents to
blow into the testing instrument, the test result is admissible (if
the result is relevant at trial) regardless of the timing of the
request. Alternatively, if he refuses, then that fact is also

1007 (4th Dep't 1991); People v. McDonough, 132 A.D.2d 997, 997, 518 N.Y.S.2d 524,
525 (4th Dep't 1987).
79 181 A.D.2d 238, 241, 585 N.Y.S.2d 861, 863 (3d Dep't 1992).
80 132 A.D.2d 997, 997, 518 N.Y.S.2d 524, 525 (4th Dep't 1987).
81 177 A.D.2d 962, 962-63, 577 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1007 (4th Dep't 1991).
82 132 A.D.2d at 997, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
83 2005 WL 2148893, at *4.
84 Id. at *4-5.
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admissible in spite of when it occurs.8 5 The warnings thus
6
remain the same.
The Kenny court justified its requirement for new warnings
as intended to alert defendants that they are "no longer subject
to the 'implied consent' provision of VTL [section] 1194."87 This
view of implied consent is overly broad and patently incorrect.
Most significantly, it ignores the basic distinction drawn by the
VTL between "the conscious driver and the unconscious or
incapacitated driver."8 8
The two-hour implied consent cap
protects those defendants incapable of consenting to chemical
tests, not those capable yet simply unwilling to do so. It is only
the unconscious or incapacitated driver who is unable to make
decisions, and who warrants protection from the state's otherwise
unchecked power in this context. Kenny's warning requirement
is thus predicated on a misconception of implied consent.
Ultimately, at least seven opinions-published in either
judicial reporters or in the New York Law Journal-have
repudiated Walsh or Brol, none of which resulted in appellate
review.8 9
Numerous courts have presumably allowed the
introduction of post-two-hour refusals since Morales, yet done so
in unpublished opinions; likewise, none have resulted in a
reported appellate decision. Indeed, Judge Camacho, in Queens
County, found a refusal gathered after two hours to be admissible
in People v. Hurtado,90 decided after Morris in 2005. Judge
85 Refusal evidence admissibility is derived from the concept of consciousness of
guilt. The guilty mind is betrayed whenever asked to blow. See People v. MacDonald,

89 N.Y.2d 908, 910, 675 N.E.2d 1219, 1220, 653 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (1996); People v.
Ferrara, 158 Misc. 2d 671, 674, 602 N.Y.S.2d 86, 89 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Richmond
County 1993).
86 The NYPD "Intoxicated Driver Examination Instruction Sheet," Form PD
244-154A (1-02)-RMU-Pent, bears out this fact, i.e., that there is only one set of
warnings administered by police to suspected drunk-drivers.
87 2005 WL 2148893, at *4.
88 People v. Morales, 161 Misc. 2d 128, 132, 611 N.Y.S.2d 980, 982 (N.Y.C. Crim.
Ct. Kings County 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. People v. Kates, 53
N.Y.2d 591, 596-57, 428 N.E.2d 852, 854-55, 444 N.Y.S.2d 446, 448-49 (1981).
89 See People v. Ward, 176 Misc. 2d 398, 403, 673 N.Y.S.2d 297, 301 (Sup. Ct.
Richmond County 1998); People v. Capraella, 165 Misc. 2d 639, 642, 629 N.Y.S.2d
965, 969 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Queens County 1995); Morales, 161 Misc. 2d at 133, 611
N.Y.S.2d at 983; People v. Cambria, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 29, 1994, at 28, col. 5 (N.Y.C.
Crim. Ct. Bronx County); People v. Frazier, N.Y. L.J., July 9, 1993, at 24, col. 1
(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx County); People v. Flora, N.Y. L.J., June 23, 1992, at 22, col.
6 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County); People v. Dillin, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 5, 1990, at 23, col.
3 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County).
90 No. 2004QN032270 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Queens County Apr. 5, 2005).
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THE "TWO-HOUR RULE"DOES NOTAPPLY

Camacho cited Torres, Ward, Coludro, and Morales, making it
clear that a post-two-hour refusal is admissible at trial. 9 1 Even
more recently, both Morris and Kenny were expressly rejected in
People v. Burns,92 in which the court noted that "[i]ndeed, the
two-hour rule has been narrowed to apply only in cases where
the defendant is incapable of consent." 93
CONCLUSION

In People v. Zawacki,94 the Fourth Department-the very
court that spurred the original controversy with Brol-recognized
"the [New York] Court of Appeals [as holding] the two-hour
limit... inapplicable to chemical tests administered pursuant to
[a] defendant's actual consent. '95 The controversy has long since
come full circle, the validity of chemical test analysis performed
beyond two hours from arrest indisputably clear. And while the
Court of Appeals has not squarely faced the issue of
refusal evidence admissibility after two hours, statutory
construction, controlling caselaw, and the paucity of rational
counterarguments overwhelmingly support its validity.

91 Id.
92 No. NA 18328/05, 2006 WL 2660913, at *4-5 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County Sept.

5, 2006).
93 Id. at *4 (citing to Ward, Morales, and Torres).
94 244 A.D.2d 954, 665 N.Y.S.2d 172 (4th Dep't 1997).

95 Id. at 955, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 173.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

